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I. INTRODUCTION
Fully contested civil litigation typically ends with the entry of a
judgment in favor of one of the combatants.1 In some situations, one of the
parties, anticipating the eventual result, may wish to voluntarily terminate
the proceedings by offering a judgment to the other side. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 provides for this option and further directs the shifting
of "costs" when a plaintiff rejects an offer from the defendant that is more
favorable than the result at trial. 2 The rule as it stands is intended to
*Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
B.A., Wright State University (1978); J.D., Northwestern University (1981).
**B.A., University of Akron (1992); J.D., University of Cincinnati (1997).
Associate, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio.
1 See FED. R. CIv. P. 58.
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 68 states:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in
the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer
the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof
and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making
of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined
by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains
to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if
it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the
commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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promote settlement, 3 and to further that end there have been numerous
proposals since the early 1980s to amend Rule 68, 4 accompanied by an
outpouring of academic commentary. 5
Yet seldom has so much talk resulted in so little action. Despite (or
perhaps because of) the cacophony of voices, Federal Rule 68 remains
unchanged. It is unclear what the fuss is all about. Even in its present form,
the option provided by Rule 68 is apparently rarely used.6 Indeed, there is
3 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
4 See Part II infra for a detailed discussion of these proposals.
5 For a sample of the literature see, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend
Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 425 (1986); Joshua P.
Davis, Toward A Jurisprudence of Trial and Settlement: Allocating Attorney's Fees by
Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REv. 65 (1996); John E.
Sprizzo, Unjustifiable Refusals to Settle and Rule 68, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 443
(1988); Richard Mincer, Note, Rule 68 Offer of Judgment: Sharpen the Sword for Swift
Settlement, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1401 (1995). A lengthier list of citations is found in
Davis, supra, at 70 n.21. More articles are cited in Part II, infra.
6 See Edward H. Cooper, Rule 68, Fee Shifting, and the Rulemaking Process, in
REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108, 108 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) ("Rule 68
has been viewed by many, including me, as an uninteresting provision that remains on
the fringe of procedure because it has been little used to scant effect."). See also
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 102 F.R.D. 407, 433 (1984) (remarking that Rule 68 is seldom used)
[hereinafter 1984 Proposal]; Tai-Yeong Chung, Settlement of Litigation Under Rule 68:
An Economic Analysis, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 261 (1996) (commenting that Rule 68 is
seldom used); Keith N. Hylton, Rule 68, The Modified British Rule, and Civil Litigation
Reform, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 73, 76 (1996) (noting the infrequent use of Rule
68).
Almost all of the above accounts appear to draw conclusions based on largely
anecdotal evidence. However, the only rigorous survey of attorneys on the use of the
present federal rule essentially comes to the same conclusions. See JOHN E. SHAPARD,
LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF AMENDMENTS TO RULE 68, FEDERAL RULES OF CIvIL
PROCEDURE (1995). This study, based on written questionnaires returned from a
scientific sampling of attorneys who litigated federal civil cases (see id. at 3-5
(describing survey)), found that in civil rights cases, only 4% settled by way of an
accepted Rule 68 offer, but offers were made but not accepted in 20% of cases that
settled anyway, and in 12% of cases that were tried. See id. at 8-9. In those two
categories of cases, 61% and 85 % of the surveyed attorneys, respectively, indicated that
Rule 68 had no effect on any settlement discussions. See id. See also Julie Davies,
Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy Between Reality and
Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197, 222-225 (1997) (interviews of civil rights lawyers
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apparently some sentiment among the federal rulemakers to discard Rule 68
entirely. 7 At the very least, no immediate change to Federal Rule 68
appears in the offing. 8
Given the overproduction of scholarship on and the underproduction of
actual change to Rule 68, we hesitate to add still more to the scholarly
debate. But we nonetheless do so for two reasons. First, almost all of the
commentary virtually ignores the statutory or rule provisions in state courts
governing the use of offers of judgment in those forums. 9 Those provisions
are a potential source of insight on the nature of offers of judgments
themselves and on whether reform at the federal level is necessary or
appropriate. A second related reason is that we conclude that upon review
of the bewildering number of reform proposals, less is more. We think
reform of Federal Rule 68 is called for, but we advocate a relatively
simple, stripped-down version which avoids many of the controversial
provisions that weigh down most current proposals. Our proposal can be
rightly criticized for its modesty, but we think incremental reform is
optimal and has the most realistic chance to come into being.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II summarizes the controversy
over Federal Rule 68 since the early 1980s and reviews the numerous
unsuccessful efforts to amend the rule. In Part III, we turn to the
experience in the states. There, we find a mix of experimentation. Many
states utilize the current federal model; others have pursued innovations,
some of which resemble the failed reform proposals for the federal rule;
and still others have declined to regulate offers of judgment at all. In Part
showed Rule 68 not to be a major factor in practice).
7 E-mail from Edward Cooper, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, United States Judicial Conference, to Michael E. Solimine (Feb. 26, 1996) (on
file with authors).
8 See id.
9 See, e.g., Chung, supra note 6, at 261 n.1 (referring in passing to "[s]everal
states" having adopted a rule "similar" to FED. R. Crv. P. 68, but giving no examples).
For rare examples of explicit discussions of state provisions, see SHAPARD, supra note
6, at 25-27 (reprinting provisions of Michigan, Florida, Nevada, California, Wisconsin
and Pennsylvania); David A. Bell, Offers of Judgment Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, 11 OHmo LAw. 14, 15 (May/June 1997) (discussing state provisions);
Lesley S. Bonney et al., Rule 68: Awakening a Sleeping Giant, 65 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 379, 422-426 (1997) (discussing provisions of California, Connecticut and
Oklahoma); Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Civil Justice
Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1585 & n.167-1587 (1994) (listing
several such provisions with discussion of their use).
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IV, we consider both explanations for innovations on this issue in the states
and the implications of state practice for change at the federal level. Part IV
also revisits and critiques the latest proposals to amend the federal rule. We
conclude with a brief defense of our own proposal to regulate offers of
judgment.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE 68
The purpose of Federal Rule 68 is to encourage settlements and avoid
protracted litigation. 10 Rule 68 permits a party defending against a claim to
make an offer of judgment, thereby precluding plaintiffs ability to make
use of the provision unless the plaintiff is being countersued. If the offer is
rejected, and the eventual judgment is less favorable to the plaintiff than the
offer, the defendant is entitled to its post-offer costs. For purposes of
Federal Rule 68, these costs do not include attorney's fees or expert
witness fees unless the particular statute under which the cause of action
arises contemplates such a remedy for a violation." A judgment entered
upon an acceptance of an offer made under Rule 68 acts.as a resolution of
the liability of the defendant and has both res judicata and collateral
estoppel effects upon the plaintiff's claims. 12 This particular type of
10 See 12 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3001, at 66 (1982) (explaining that the purpose of Rule 68 is to encourage settlement).
See also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
For purposes of this Article we assume that it is sound policy to encourage
settlements. This is, of course, not an uncontroversial proposition. Compare Owen Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that settlement should be
discouraged in certain types of public law litigation) with Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement
(in Some Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663 (1995) (contesting Fiss's position).
11 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. Prior to the Marek decision, at the federal level,
attorney's fees were never subsumed in the definition of costs. In dissent, Justice
Brennan vehemently disagreed with the majority's proposition that the awarding of
attorney's fees under "costs" was intended by Congress, specifically arguing that the
drafters of the Federal Rules intended "costs" to mean only taxable costs traditionally
allowed under the common law. See id. at 18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also cited
eleven different provisions within the Federal Rules that specifically authorize courts to
award attorney's fees as "expenses," not "costs," suggesting that the drafters intended
something other than the majority's interpretation of Rule 68 "costs." See id. at 20
(Brennan, ., dissenting).
12 See Gregory P. Crinion, Offers of Judgment: The Federal Rule, 65 Wis. LAW.
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provision was entirely new at the federal level, but several states had
already implemented offer of judgment statutes which the Advisory
Committee used as guideposts for Federal Rule 68.13
Rule 68 was thought to encourage settlement and avoid litigation
because the claimant would still recover costs if the judgment entered was
more than the offer. At the same time, the defending party could be free of
the case by offering an accepted settlement, or could be rewarded with
costs if the judgment entered was less favorable to the plaintiff than the
defendant's unaccepted offer. Thus, a leading treatise stated that Rule 68
was of "great benefit" to courts because of the diminished burden of
litigation. 14 However, the goal of encouraging settlement and discouraging
litigation has been questioned by some commentary. 15 At a visceral level,
these commentators believe that the twin goals behind Rule 68 are contrary
to the substantive right, created by the Constitution or the Congress, of
access to the courts where particular jurisdiction to hear a matter, such as
public law litigation, has been conferred on a court. 16
Because Federal Rule 68 has not been widely utilized by practitioners,
the overwhelming majority of the commentary and the Federal Rules
Advisory Committee have determined that Federal Rule 68 has not been
effective in achieving its intended purpose. 17 According to the Advisory
25, 30 (1992).
13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 12A CHARLES
A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 577 (1982). Federal Rule 68
was modeled after 2 MINN. STAT. § 9323 (Mason 1927). See id.
14 12 WRIGHTET AL., supra note 10, § 3001, at 67.
15 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 5, at 426; Fiss, supra note 10, at 1074.
16 See Martin H. Redish, The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the
Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1378, 1386 (1985) (book
review). Professor Redish argues that federal courts have been provided jurisdiction for
a particular reason, which in comparison to the need to relieve dockets, imposes too
much of a cost to society. See id. See also Burbank, supra note 5, at 436-437.
17 See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee's note (on the 1983
proposed Amendment), reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 337, 363 (1983). The law review
commentary has been no different. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Improving Settlement
Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 226 (1994); Roy D. Simon, Jr.,
The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter Simon, The
Riddle of Rule 68]; Roy D. Simon Jr., Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship
Between Offers of Judgment and Statutory Attorney's Fees, 53 U. CiN. L. R v. 889,
891 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroads]; Sprizzo, supra note 5, at
445; Mincer, supra note 5.
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Committee, Rule 68 is ineffective for two principal reasons: (1) the actual
costs sanction, except in civil rights cases where attorney's fees are
defined, was an insufficient incentive to motivate the parties to use the rule;
and (2) that the rule was available only to the party defending against a
claim and not to claimants, thus, effectively preventing plaintiffs from
invoking Rule 68.18 In response to this perceived ineffectiveness, the
Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rule 68 in both 1983 and
1984.
In the 1983 proposal to amend Rule 68, the Advisory Committee
specifically articulated its purpose for Rule 68-to foment the process of
settlement. 19 The 1983 proposal revised Rule 68 to permit all parties,
including claimants, to make offers of settlement, and altered the earlier
provision that the offer be made at least ten days before trial to at least
thirty days before trial. 20 The Advisory Committee felt that the ten day
period was too short to enable many offerees to act upon offers put forth by
offerors. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee expanded the definition of
costs to include attorney's fees from the date of the offer. Specifically, the
addition of attorney's fees within the definition of costs was intended to
increase the risk factor faced by an offeree and was expected to encourage
serious deliberation of an offer at an earlier stage of the process, which
would then dispose of cases before the major litigation costs accrued.2 1 The
assessment of attorney's fees was left to the judge's discretion to the extent
that the trial court found an award of attorney's fees as "unjustified" or
"excessive." '22 However, any offer made in bad faith by the offeror, as
18 See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee's note, supra note 17, at
363. 19 See id. at 364.
20 See id. at 365-366. This change reflected the notion that parties should be given
enough time to consider settlement after sufficient discovery but far enough in advance
of trial to avoid litigation. See id. at 365. The amended provision also extended to 30,
from 10 the number of days the offeree had to accept the offeror's proposal. See id.
21 See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee's note, supra note 17, at
364.
22 See id. The Advisory Committee wanted to avoid a mandatory attorney's fees
provision because the harshness of the imposition would impose a heavy award of
expenses against an offeree under all the circumstances. See id. The court was
instructed to exercise discretion and evaluate certain factors which would aid its
evaluation as to whether the attorney's fees penalty would be proper for the particular
case at bar. See id.
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determined by the court, would not merit an award of costs or expenses. 23
The 1983 proposal received heavy criticism and was eventually
withdrawn by the Advisory Committee.24 Most of the criticism arose from
attorneys representing civil rights litigants who feared that implementation
of proposed Rule 68 would have a chilling effect on civil rights litigation,
either deterring litigation or forcing premature, deficient settlements of
actions. 25 In turn, this perceived chilling effect would conflict with the
policy of fee shifting statutes specifically designed by Congress to
encourage meritorious civil rights litigation. 26 Other plaintiffs' lawyers
argued that the 1983 proposal would destroy the contingency fee system,
forcing the attorney to warn the potential litigant that the plaintiff might be
required to pay defendant's attorney's fees if the plaintiff rejected a
settlement offer and then lost at trial. 27 One commentator argued that the
proposal would place attorneys in the unenviable position of advising a
client whether to accept the settlement offer on the basis of the potential
Rule 68 sanction rather than the merits of the offer. 28
One glaring deficiency of the 1983 proposal was the potential for
collateral litigation generated on the issue of whether a judge correctly
imposed or refused to impose attorney's fees as part of costs in a particular
case.29 Ironically, a rule that was specifically created to encourage
settlement and avoid litigation would, instead, create collateral litigation on
the issue of the imposition of attorney's fees when the actual original claim
23 See id. at 362. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a defending offeror
from making a reckless offer that the offeror knows the offeree will never accept. See
id. This issue of bad faith is to be determined objectively on the basis of the all the facts
surrounding the circumstances of the case. See id. at 367.
24 See 1984 Proposal, supra note 6, at 432-437.
25 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 14-15; Janice Toran,
Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees: Comparing English Payment Into Court and
Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L. Rv. 301, 305 (1986).
26 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 14-15. Also, some
commentators argued that the 1983 proposal would violate the Rules Enabling Act by
abridging or modifying the substantive right to attorney's fees. See id. See also
Burbank, supra note 5, at 434-435. But see Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
27 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 14. While the court still
would possess the discretion as to whether to include attorney's fees, no lawyer could
assure the client that the court would use that discretion to the benefit of the client. See
id.
28 See Toran, supra note 25, at 305-306.
29 See id. at 312.
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had been settled. 30
In response to the criticism of the 1983 proposal, the Advisory
Committee the next year offered another proposal to placate the concerns
expressed under the 1983 proposal. Again, the Advisory Committee cited
its finding that in its present form, Rule 68 had "rarely" been invoked and
had been considered "largely ineffective" as a means of achieving the goals
of avoiding litigation and encouraging settlement. 31 In a major departure
from the 1983 proposal, the 1984 proposal abandoned the monetary
comparison between the offer and the final judgment, replacing it with a
flexible standard that asked whether the offer was unreasonably rejected. 32
Even if a court determined that an offer was rejected unreasonably, the
1984 proposal granted the court broad ranging discretion to devise "an
appropriate sanction" for the offeree. Thus, post-offer attorney's fees
would not automatically be shifted, but as the Advisory Committee
specifically provided, Rule 68 sanctions could include attorney's fees in the
appropriate context. 33 The new amendment also provided certain factors
that the judge was to evaluate to make sure that the award was neither
excessive nor insufficient; however, the discretion granted to the trial court
could not be used in a manner that would defeat the purposes of the rule.34
This discretion to create an "appropriate sanction" also allowed a plaintiff-
offeree to recover attorney's fees pursuant to the statute under which her
claim arose even if she had rejected a more favorable offer. The 1984
proposal also granted discretion to the court to impose sanctions where the
plaintiff-offeree rejected an offer of settlement, and subsequently, was
awarded nothing at trial. 35
30 See 1984 Proposal, supra note 6, at 436.
3 1 Id. at 433.
32 See id. at 435. The 1984 proposal also narrowed the window of time that offers
could be made requiring a wait of at least 60 days after service of the summons and
complaint, and not less than 90 days before trial. See id. at 434. Further, the 1984
proposal allowed an offeree 60 days in which to accept or reject an offer or
counteroffer. See id.
33 See id. at 434-435.
34 See id. at 436. The intended effect of the amendment was to subject an offeree,
who had acted unreasonably and caused needless delay and increase in the cost of the
litigation, to be subject to an appropriate sanction by the court. See id.
35 See id. at 436-437. See generally Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346
(1981) (holding that Rule 68 sanctions only apply when a plaintiff is awarded a
judgment that is less than the defendant's offer, not when plaintiff is awarded nothing at
all).
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Because the 1983 proposal was criticized in large part due to its
mandatory imposition of fee shifting when the judgment finally obtained
was less favorable to the offeree than the offer, the 1984 provision vested
discretion in the trial court as to the issue of the imposition of costs on the
offeree. 36 However, the 1984 proposal was received with as much
consternation as its 1983 counterpart, especially from the civil rights bar. 37
Critics also raised the new argument that the 1984 proposal would lead to
an intolerable amount of collateral litigation, over both the
unreasonableness of rejections and the appropriateness of particular
sanctions. 38 Opponents charged that the proposal would threaten the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine, because
determining whether a rejection was unreasonable would often entail an
inquiry into both the attorney's discussions with her client and the
attorney's evaluation of the case.39 Furthermore, the opponents argued that
any evaluation of the reasonableness of the refusal to accept an offer could
conflict with the client's specific wishes, poignantly so in cases where the
plaintiff was seeking injunctive or declaratory relief that would not be so
easily quantified. 40 Finally, critics charged that investing the judge with the
ability to tailor an "appropriate sanction" would bestow a newfound power
to trial courts over litigants, effectively coercing settlements before trial by
threatening sanctions before trial, or punishing litigants egregiously after
36 See 1984 Proposal, supra note 6, at 436-437.
37 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 17-18; Sprizzo, supra note
5, at 447-448; Toran, supra note 25, at 306.
38 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 18; Sprizzo, supra note 5,
at 447-448. Critics cited the difficulty of determining both the amount of relief that
might reasonably have been expected if the claimant prevailed and the appropriate
sanction on the offeree; determinations that might well lead to a second round of
litigation in each case.
39 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 18-19. Professor Simon
argued that clients unwilling to risk revelation of their secrets might cease to be fully
candid with their attorney, thereby undercutting the fundamental rationale for the
attorney-client privilege. See id.
40 See Thomas L. Cubbage, Note, Federal Rule 68 Offers of Judgment and
Equitable Relief. Where Angels Fear to Tread, 70 TEx. L. Rv. 465, 471 (1991).
Cubbage articulates that the "inherent unquantifiability of nonpecuniary injunctive
relief" for all practical purposes makes the applicability of Rule 68 impossible. Id.
(quoting Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 661 (4th Cir. 1990)); see, e.g.,
Spencer, 894 F.2d at 664. The Spencer court applied Rule 68 to equitable relief over the
plaintiff's objection.
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trial. 41
The controversy over the 1984 proposals had barely subsided when the
Supreme Court decided Marek v. Chesny.42 In Marek, the father of a boy
who had been shot and killed by the police brought a cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a number of state tort law claims. 43 Prior to trial, a
Rule 68 offer was made to the plaintiff for a sum of $100,000, which the
plaintiff did not accept. 44 Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict of
$5,000 on the state law claim, $52,000 for the § 1983 action and $3,000 in
punitive damages. 45 The trial court was subsequently faced with the conflict
between awarding costs to the prevailing plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,
or upholding the defendant's Rule 68 motion awarding costs when the
judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff was less favorable than the
settlement offer. In the trial court's estimation, attorney's fees could be
shifted to the defendant in this particular case because the section 1988
action defined attorney's fees as costs. However, the Seventh Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Richard Posner, reversed the trial court holding on
grounds that echoed the criticisms voiced by commentators who had
expressed opposition to the 1983 and 1984 proposals. 46
The United States Supreme Court reversed. An opinion by Chief
Justice Warren Burger explained that the drafters of Rule 68 were aware of
numerous federal statutes defining attorney's fees as part of court costs and
that the drafters must have intended for Rule 68 costs to include attorney's
41 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 19. Professor Simon argued
that the sanctions would further chill the enforcement of civil rights and penalize zealous
advocacy.
42 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
43 See id. at 3.
44 See id. at 3-4.
45 See id. at 4. Plaintiff then filed a request for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, which provides that a prevailing party in a § 1983 action may be awarded
attorney's fees "as part of the costs." Id.
46 See Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 1983), rev'd 473 U.S. 1
(1985). Judge Posner argued that neither the history of Rule 68 nor § 1988 revealed any
intent to include attorney's fees as costs. See Chesney, 720 F.2d at 479. Secondly,
Judge Posner stated that the use of Rule 68 in this manner would frustrate the
congressional purpose of encouraging meritorious civil rights actions. See id. Finally,
he argued that allowing Rule 68 to cut off attorney's fees violated the Rules Enabling
Act by abridging the plaintiff's substantive rights to attorney's fees under § 1988. See
id.
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fees whenever an applicable statute defines attorney's fees as costs. 47 The
Court also rejected the argument that using Rule 68 as a cost-shifting
device would discourage civil rights litigation.48 Finally, the Court
reasoned that Rule 68's clear policy favored settlements of all lawsuits and
civil rights plaintiffs deserved no more protection than any other type of
plaintiff.49
In a vehement dissent, Justice William Brennan castigated the majority
for its interpretation on the interplay between Rule 68 and § 1988. Justice
Brennan argued that the majority's interpretation conflicted with the
drafter's intentions, defining costs to mean only taxable costs traditionally
allowed at common law.50 Furthermore, he stated that the majority's
interpretation would violate the Rules Enabling Act and improperly infringe
upon the province of Congress without prior justification. 51 Finally, Justice
Brennan cited the Court's failure to submit any authority for the proposition
that courts or attorneys defined the cost-shifting provisions of Rule 68 as
including attorney's fees. 52
The reaction to Marek was explosive. Professor Roy Simon analogized
Rule 68 to a "sleeping giant which the Supreme Court had awakened by
virtue of its decision." 53 Other commentators, in both the academic
journals and the literature of the practicing bar, predicted that defendants
would make offers of judgment more frequently due to the rule's increased
notoriety. 54 Some argued that the Marek interpretation of Rule 68 would
induce the Judicial Conference or Congress into amending the rule because
47 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 5. For the Court, all costs properly awardable in an
action are to be considered within the scope of Rule 68 costs. In order to hold
differently, Congress had to expressly indicate its intention to the contrary. See id.
48 See id. at 9. The Court cited the fact that many civil rights plaintiffs would
receive greater compensation in settlement than they would have received at trial. See
id. at 10.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 18-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further cited eleven
specific provisions in the Federal Rules where attorney's fees are specifically
mentioned. Rule 68, he pointed out, was not one of those provisions. See id. at 20.
51 See id. at 22.
52 See id. at 20.
53 Roy D. Simon, Jr., The New Meaning of Rule 68: Marek v. Chesny and
Beyond, 14 N.Y.U. Rnv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475, 476-477 n.2-3 (1986).
54 See Cubbage, supra note 40, at 467. Cubbage also argues that Marek's potential
attorney's fees award greatly increases the attractiveness of offers of judgments for
defendants. See id.
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the Supreme Court (in this view) radically altered its provisions. 55 And
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Marek, specifically called for judicial
conference or congressional action to resolve the newly created problem.
56
However, twelve years have passed, and Federal Rule 68 remains
unamended in the form criticized by the Advisory Committee. 57
Commentators have continued to devote attention to these, and other,
proposals to modify Rule 68. Indeed, a near cottage industry has arisen
among economists to examine the workings of various proposals. 58 The
conventional wisdom among economists is that the present Federal Rule
either has little effect on or perhaps decreases the settlement rate. The
reason is that the rule only awards costs, which are usually relatively small
and far less than incurred attorney's fees. While the rule seemingly
increases the defendant's incentive to make realistic settlement offers, the
effect may be static since it potentially makes litigation more costly to the
plaintiff, even if she wins, and the defendant may thus offer less in
settlement.59 To combat the disincentives of the present rule, some
55 See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, supra note 17, at 23.
56 See Marek, 473 U.S. at 42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
57 This does not mean that official federal action has been entirely absent. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas has promulgated, as a
local rule, an offer of judgment provision that allows both parties to make an offer, and
imposes litigation costs on the offeree if the final judgment is of more benefit to the
offeror by 10%. See Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co., 885 F. Supp. 934
(E.D. Tex. 1995) (upholding validity of this rule despite conflict with Rule 68 on basis
that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 permits local deviation from the Federal
Rules). See generally Craig Madison Patrick, Comment, The Offer You Can't Refuse:
Offers of Judgment in the Eastern District of Texas, 46 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 1075 (1994).
Recently, the Fifth Circuit invalidated this local rule on the basis that it was not
authorized by the Civil Justice Reform Act. See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123
F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997).
Likewise, one of the provisions of the "Contract With America" in the 104th
Congress would have extensively amended Federal Rule 68 by, inter alia, permitting
any party in diversity cases to make such offers and provide for the shifting of
attorney's fees under certain circumstances. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995)
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332), reprinted in Davis, supra note 5, at 79 n.51. The
measure passed the House of Representatives, but no further action was taken in the
Senate during the 104th Congress.
58 See Hylton, supra note 6, at 76 (stating that while "seldom used by attorneys,"
Rule 68 is a "popular subject ... for economists interested in analyzing litigation
incentives.").
59 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 574-576 (4th ed. 1992)
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economists have argued that, to varying degrees, any party should be able
to invoke the rule, costs should include attorney's fees or that post-offer
costs should be paid to a third party, like the court.
60
In contrast to the mostly theoretical work of economists, Professor
Thomas Rowe reported a "dearth of empirical work" on the topic in
1988,61 a position he reiterated in 1995.62 This literature provides some
support for the conventional wisdom that Federal Rule 68 is, in fact, little
used, 63 due in part to the difficulties in understanding and applying the
present rule.64 Controlled experiments with lawyers and law students using
different versions of the present rule have come to varying conclusions,
65
but they do suggest that Rule 68 would have a more robust impact on
settlement if attorney's fees, as well as other costs, were subject to being
shifted. 66
III. THE STATE EXPERIENCE
Discussion of civil procedure in state courts typically starts with an
analysis of those states that have used the Federal Rules as a model, and so
shall we. As described in Professor John Oakley's leading article, 67 twenty-
(general discussion); 12 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3001, at 69 (summarizing
economic literature); Chung, supra note 6, at 262-263 (same).
60 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in
REFORMING THE CIvIL JusTicE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 13-37 (summarizing and
analyzing these proposals); Chung, supra note 6 (advancing payment to third party
proposal); Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93
(1986) (advancing, inter alia, a proposal to permit plaintiff or defendant to make an
offer of judgment).
61 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. with Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of
Settlement: A Preliminary Report, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB., Autumn 1988, at 13, 19.
62 See David A. Anderson & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical Evidence on
Settlement Devices: Does Rule 68 Encourage Settlement?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 519,
520 (1995).
63 See generally SHAPARD, supra note 6.
64 See id.; see also Rowe with Vidmar, supra note 61, at 30.
65 See, e.g., Anderson & Rowe, supra note 62, at 534 (showing that the authors'
survey indicated, inter alia, that a two-sided fee-shifting rule would not substantially
affect settlement rate).
66 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & David A. Anderson, One-Way Fee Shifting Statutes
and Offer of Judgment Rules: An Experiment, 36 JuRwirwcs J. 255, 273 (1996).
67 John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey
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two states, plus the District of Columbia, essentially replicate (with
relatively minor exceptions) the Federal Rules, 68 while another thirteen
states have, by rule or statute, substantially followed the federal model. 69
The remaining states use procedural regimes not substantially similar to the
federal model. 70
The states are thus not unanimous in following the federal model, and
the same is true for offer of judgment provisions. By our account, 71 about
twenty-eight states (including a majority of the federal replica jurisdictions),
plus the District of Columbia, have provisions identical or substantially
similar to Federal Rule 68. Another thirteen states have provisions which
depart from the Federal Rule in significant ways, while nine states
apparently have no provision at all. In the latter states, presumably, the
parties can still make offers of judgment, but a failure to accept carries no
adverse consequences under any circumstances.
The states that depart from the Federal Rule appear to have been
motivated, at least in part, by some criticisms of Rule 68. As noted above,
those criticisms have included the minuscule nature of sanctions embodied
in the threat of shifting only costs, and the failure to allow the plaintiff to
make an offer of judgment. Some states have attacked the problems of the
Federal Rule by imposing a percentage of the settlement interest rate as a
sanction for an offeree refusing to accept an offer that was more favorable
than the actual judgment received. 72 Other states have imposed the
requirement that a judgment be at least 120% of the offer in order to
trigger the award of attorney's fees in addition to the amount of the final
judgment.73 For example, in order for an offeror to recover costs in
Florida, the judgment obtained must be twenty-five percent greater than the
of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1367 (1986).
68 See id. at 1377. The authors identified those jurisdictions that replicate the
federal rules by utilizing nine criteria, including whether the numbering and ordering of
the state rules conforms to the federal model, and the extent to which the state rules
have replicated important amendments to the Federal Rules. See id. at 1374-1375.
69 See id. at 1377-1378.
70 See id.
71 A list of the offer of judgment provisions in each state is provided in Appendix
A. The list reflects research through the summer of 1997.
72 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Michie 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 807.01(4) (West 1994); N.J. CT. R. 4:58-2 (West 1992).
73 See N.J. CT. R. 4:58-2. This type of requirement would mitigate to some
degree the harshness of the sanction because sanctions are not imposed until the
recovery meets the percentage threshold.
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offer if the plaintiff is to recover costs; or the judgment obtained must be
twenty-five percent less than the offer, if the defendant is to recover
costs. 74 Other states allowed plaintiffs to extend offers of judgments to
defendants, triggering the same sanctions imposed on the plaintiff for
rejecting a more favorable offer. 75
Another issue regarding the effectiveness of an offer of judgment
statute is whether the imposition of sanctions for rejection of a more
favorable offer is mandatory by the language of the rule, or whether such
sanctions are at the trial court's discretion based on its evaluation of the
need for the sanction of attorney's fees on the particular facts of each case.
The majority of state offer of judgment provisions provide that the
sanctions imposed will be mandatory, not discretionary. 76 Florida's offer of
judgment statute specifically illustrates this problem. 77 The statute itself lists
factors a trial court must evaluate in determining whether an offer has been
made in good faith. Any offer the court finds made in bad faith allows the
trial judge to prohibit an award of costs and attorney's fees to the offeror.
Potentially, provisions like Florida's will generate more litigation in cases
where the propriety of the litigant's settlement is subjected to subsequent
collateral litigation, even though the actual cause of action that gave rise to
the controversy has been settled.
Innovation in offer of judgment procedures continues at the state level.
Consider the example of Ohio, which is otherwise a replica state. The Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for an award of costs when a
plaintiff refuses to accept an offer that is more favorable than the eventual
verdict.78 Ohio Rule 68 itself does not limit the offer of judgment tactic,
and the staff notes to Ohio Rule 68 encourage offers of settlement and
voluntary resolution of litigation. However, the staff notes explicitly reject
the federal approach of awarding costs to the defendant if the plaintiff
rejects a more favorable offer than she receives at trial. Ohio rejected the
74 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 1994).
75 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Michie 1994); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-17-202 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 807.01 (West 1994); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 68 (1996); CAL. Civ. Paoc. CODE § 998 (West
1993); N.J. CT. R. 4:58-2 (West 1992).
76 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-202 (West 1994); ALA. R. Civ. P.
68 (Michie 1996); ARiz. R. Civ. P. 68 (1996); ARK. R. Civ. P. 68 (Michie 1997);
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1993); DEL. R. Civ. P. 68 ; HAw. R. Civ. P. 68.
77 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79(7) (West 1994).
78 See OiO R. Civ. P. 68.
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federal approach because the offer of judgment provision, as argued by the
staff notes to Ohio Rule 68, too "often had a one-sided, coercive effect." 79
In light of this perceived coercive effect, the staff notes explicitly rejected
adoption of Federal Rule 68 for use as a basis of a costs proceeding.
Indeed, by adopting Ohio Rule 68, the Ohio Supreme Court effectively
repealed former statutes that, analogous to Federal Rule 68, permitted the
use of an offer of judgment by a defendant as a basis of a costs
proceeding. 80
The Rules Advisory Committee to the Ohio Supreme Court revisited
the issue in 1996,81 when the Court published for comment a revised Ohio
Rule of Civil Procedure 68.82 The proposal was quite similar to present
Federal Rule 68, with the exception that it covered offers of judgment by
plaintiffs or defendants. 83 If the plaintiff's unaccepted offer was more
favorable than the relief obtained by the plaintiff at trial, then the plaintiff
would be awarded double costs. 84 By its terms, the proposal did not apply
to class action cases85 or to claims for attorney's fees. 86
The proposed Staff Note found that the original Staff Note's fear of a
79 OHio R. Civ. P. 68 staff notes. Basically, use of the Ohio offer of judgment rule
is nonexistent because the language of the Rule imposes no penalty on the offeree for
rejecting an offer. See id.
80 See id.
81 The Ohio Supreme Court is granted rulemaking authority by Article IV, Section
5(B) of the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio General Assembly has the option to veto
proposed rules, somewhat similar to the federal system. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court
only promulgates rules for consideration that have first been proposed by the Rules
Advisory Committee to the Court. See Sup. CT. R. FOR TiE GovT. OF THE BAR OF
Omo XII (describing duties of the Rules Advisory Committee). See generally 4
STANLEY E. HARPER, JR. & MICHAEL E. SoLIMNE, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 145.05 (1996) (describing the rulemaling process in Ohio).
During the period in question, Professor Solimine was counsel (i.e., the reporter)
to the Civil Rules Subcommittee of the Rules Advisory Committee, and was involved in
the drafting process for the proposed amendment to Ohio Rule 68. The discussions in
this Article of that proposal are solely those of the authors and are not necessarily
shared by the Committee or the Ohio Supreme Court.
82 The proposal with an accompanying proposed staff note was published in 69
OHIO ST. BAR ASS'N. REP. xxxvii, xlv, xlvi, xlvii-xlix (Oct. 7, 1996), and is reprinted
in full in Appendix B [hereinafter Proposed Staff Note].
83 See Proposed OHIo R. Civ. P. 68(A)(1).
84 See Proposed OHio R. Civ. P. 68(A)(3).
85 See Proposed OHIO R. Civ. P. 68(B)(1).
86 See Proposed OHIO R. Civ. P. 68(B)(4).
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"one-sided coercive" effect was "difficult to measure" and often appeared
"to be based almost wholly on anecdotal evidence."87 Given the possibility
that some version of an offer of judgment rule can encourage settlements,
the prior Ohio approach was rejected. 88 Unlike the present Federal Rule,
the proposal governs offers by plaintiffs; if "the purpose of the rule is to
reward parties who make unaccepted offers of judgment which end up
being more favorable (to the nonaccepting party) than the relief awarded,
then there seems no particular reason why plaintiffs' offers should not be
covered." 89 Because prevailing plaintiffs would already be awarded costs, 90
doubling such costs would provide "an extra, but not extravagant, reward
to the plaintiff" under these circumstances. 91
With regard to the exceptions, class actions were excluded from
coverage, because to permit, in effect, private settlement of such suits
could conflict with the judicial duty to approve settlement of such actions.92
87 Proposed Staff Note, supra note 82, at xlvii.
88 See id.
89 1d. at xlviii.
90 See Ouio R. Civ. P. 54(D) which is substantively identical to FED. R. Civ. P.
54(d). Actually, award of costs under Federal Rule 54(d) and most of its state
counterparts is discretionary, while the proposal in question makes the award
mandatory. See SHAPARD, supra note 6, at 1 n.4.
91 Proposed Staff Note, supra note 82, at xlviii. The Federal Judicial Center's
recent survey of attorneys on the use and effect of present Federal Rule 68 and its
proposed modifications, indicated that attorneys supported-in lieu of or in addition to
other modifications of Rule 68-an award of anywhere from twice to five times the
amount of costs that otherwise would be given. See SHAPARD, supra note 6, at 52-53.
92 See Proposed Staff Note, supra note 82, at xlvii (citing Omo R. Crv. P. 23(E)).
For the same reason, shareholder derivative suits were also excluded. See id. (citing
Orno R. Civ. P. 23.1). Present Federal Rule 68 has no such exclusion, and at least one
court has stated that "in the context of class actions, Rule 68 offers of judgment are
routinely employed despite the fact all agreements must subsequently be approved by
the court after a fairness hearing." Gordon v. Gouline, 81 F.3d 235, 239 (D.C. Cir.
1996). Nonetheless, we think the more prudent course is to exclude such cases from the
coverage of the proposal because:
Rule 68 consequences do not seem appropriate if the offeree accepts the offer but
the court refuses to approve settlement on that basis. It may be unfair to make an
award against representative parties, and even more unfair to seek to reach
nonparticipating class members. The risk of an award, moreover, may create a
conflict of interest that chills efforts to represent the interests of others.
Cooper, supra note 6, at 146. See also 12 WRiGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3001.1, at
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Referencing the controversy over the Marek case, the drafters of the
proposal opted to exclude claims for the award of attorney's fees, finding
persuasive the criticism of Marek that it created "a tension with the
promotion of private enforcement of law embodied in a statutory fee
shifting provision." 93
During the comment period, the proposal received some support,94 but
generated vociferous opposition from the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
(OATL), a group of plaintiffs' attorneys. 95 They argued that the proposal
was unnecessary, since there was purportedly no evidence of "an
overabundance of unnecessary trials." 96 Moreover, they claimed, the
proposal would have a chilling effect on plaintiffs, because "[n]o credible
argument can be made... that personal injury or wrongful death plaintiffs
76-77 (similar analysis).
93 Proposed Staff Note, supra note 82, at xlix.
94 See Letter from Judge John R. Moser to Keith Bartlett, Assistant Administrative
Director, Supreme Court of Ohio 1 (Oct. 10, 1996) (supporting Rule 68 proposal and
suggesting incentives in proposal not large enough) (on file with authors); Letter from
Jerome C. Tinianow, Esq. to Keith Bartlett, Assistant Administrative Director,
Supreme Court of Ohio 1-3 (Oct. 29, 1996) (advancing similar arguments) (on file with
authors).
95 OATL was founded in 1954 as an organization of attorneys who represent
individual plaintiffs in personal injury and related cases. Current membership is 2,600
attorneys. See Richard Mason, What is the Academy?, Omo L. W., Feb. 17, 1997, at
56. The organization has been active in the rulemaking process in Ohio. For example,
OATL successfully opposed making Rule 11 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure more
like Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (as amended in 1983). See HARPER
& SOLImNE, supra note 81, § 151.23, at 320. It also successfully opposed curbing Rule
41(A)(1)(a) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (permitting plaintiffs to voluntarily
dismiss suits without prejudice at any time prior to the commencement of trial), and
making it more like Rule 41(a)(1)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which
only permits such dismissals prior to service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment), by limiting such dismissals to at least five days before a scheduled trial date.
See 5 MICHAEL E. SOLnmNE, ANDERSON'S OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE § 168.01, at 114-115
(1994). The organization also proposed an amendment to Ohio's discovery rules,
requiring judges to monitor protective orders sealing settlement agreements and other
material in a case. The Rules Advisory Committee did not recommend adopting the
proposal and the Supreme Court took no further action on the matter. See id. at 159.11,
at 16 n.74.
96 Letter from Dale K. Perdue, President, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers to
Keith T. Bartlett, Assistant Administrative Director, Supreme Court of Ohio 2 (Dec. 2,
1996) (on file with authors).
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are on an equal footing with corporate defendants or the insurance
companies that insure tortfeasors. The economic leverage-and hence the
ability to tolerate risk-clearly rests with the latter." 97 Shortly thereafter,
the Ohio Supreme Court, without comment, withdrew the proposal from
further consideration. 98
IV. LESSONS OF THE STATE EXPERIENCE WITH OFFERS OF JUDGMENT
Disparate though it is, we think the experience of the various states
regarding the regulation of offers of judgment can inform debate within
individual states and at the federal level. In effect, to use Justice Brandeis'
famous phrase, states can be seen as "laboratories of experimentation" 99 on
97 Id.
98 See 70 Oino ST. BAR ASS'N REP. xlvi (Feb. 3, 1997). One writer contacted the
Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court after the withdrawal of the Rule 68 proposal:
Several justices did respond to inquiries regarding their position and indicated that
the vote on the proposed amendment was a close one. One justice opined that a
motivating factor in that justice's opposition to the amendment was the greater
disparity in bargaining power between state plaintiffs and defendants than in
federal court.
Bell, supra note 9, at 16. The reasons advanced by the one justice are of interest, even
though they were not advanced by the OATL. It is true that institutional differences
between federal and state courts may induce certain types of litigants pursuing certain
types of cases to choose one forum over the other. See generally Victor E. Flango,
Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REv. 961 (1995)
(discussing various considerations that drive forum shopping). To our knowledge,
however, there is little or no reliable empirical evidence that supports the generalization
that there is "greater disparity in bargaining power between state plaintiffs and
defendants than in federal court," in Ohio or anywhere else. Cy. Carol R. Flango,
Caseload Burden in State and Federal Courts: Comparing State Court Tort and
Contract Cases to Federal Diversity Cases, 15 STATE CT. J. 10, 14 (Fall 1991)
(presenting an empirical study of cases in various federal and state courts, including
those in Cincinnati and Cleveland, Ohio, which indicated, inter alia, that individuals are
more likely to sue other individuals in state court, while "individuals and corporations
both tend to bring suits against corporations in federal court.").
99 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). For critiques of the usefulness of this metaphor, see James A. Gardner, The
"States-As-Laboratories" Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REv.
475 (1996); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903 (1994).
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the optimum type(s) of offer of judgment provisions.
The best evidence from the states would be a tightly controlled
scientific experiment on the use and effect of one or more versions of Rule
68, or surveys of the present practices of attorneys in a given state.100
Unfortunately, we are unaware of any such studies. The only one that, to
our knowledge, comes close is Alaska's offer of judgment provision.
Alaska is a replica state, 101 but its Rule 68 covers both plaintiffs and
defendants and permits both costs and attorney's fees to be shifted. 1°2 A
survey of attorneys in that state revealed that the Alaska provision did
encourage parties, particularly plaintiffs, to settle. 103
With regard to the other states, we can only infer how the provisions
have operated. As has been noted, a curious feature of the diffusion of
innovation 1°4 in this area is that the most populous states, save Ohio, are
not Federal Rule replica states. 10 5 And of those states, several (California,
100 Cf. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Empirical Research on Offer of Settlement Devices,
DUKE L. MAG., Spring 1996, at 13, 15 (calling for similar experimenting).
101 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 67, at 1380.
102 See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 68. For a discussion of this provision, see ALASKA
JUDICIAL CouNciL, ALASKA'S ENGLISH RuLE: ATToRNEY's FEE SHIFrING IN CIVIL
CASES 68-69 (1995) [hereinafter Alaska Study]. Alaska is unique among the states in
adopting a version of the English Rule on attorney's fees, where the losing party pays
such fees to the opponent, as opposed to the American Rule, where absent statutory or
contractual provision to the contrary, each party pays its own attorney's fees. See
Susanne Di Pietro, The English Rule at Work in Alaska, 80 JUDICATURE 88 (1996).
103 See Alaska Study, supra note 102, at 117-118. More specifically, the study
found that "defendants found the offer of judgment provision created a strong incentive
for plaintiffs to settle," and attorneys on both sides found the effect of Alaska Rule 68
accentuated by the fact of Alaska's adoption of the English Rule on attorney-fee
shifting. Id. at 117 (footnote omitted). While plaintiffs made Rule 68 offers, the
attorneys felt such "offers seemed to function more as negotiation tools and did not
seem to be taken seriously as defendants' offers." Id. at 118.
10 4 The seminal article on the diffusion of innovations among the states is Jack L.
Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. SCI.
Rev. 880 (1969) (studying adoption by state legislatures). Such studies have been
conducted on the adoption of doctrines by courts. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon &
Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of
Difusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975 (1981); Michael E.
Solimine, The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson: An Empirical Note, 56 ALn. L. REV. 773
(1993).
105 See Oakley & Coon, supra note 67, at 1425; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules,
Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
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Florida and Texas) have innovative provisions that, among other things,
permit both sides to offer judgments and shift more than costs under certain
circumstances. 106 Had such provisions greatly and adversely impacted the
settlement rate in general, or plaintiffs in particular, one might think that
such circumstances would have gained more attention. The affected interest
groups in those states, one might think, would expend political capital to
repeal purportedly onerous provisions. 107 Interest group impact on
rulemaking for courts appears to be increasing, at least at the federal
level, 10 8 and the experience from Ohio described before suggests that such
groups will not ignore offer of judgment provisions.
In the absence of more empirical evidence from each state we advance
these conclusions with much hesitation. But we think federal (and state)
rule-makers can and should draw on this experience. Many of the Federal
Rules themselves, of course, were modeled after state procedural rules, 10 9
and even today some amendments to the Federal Rules have their genesis,
at least in part, on the state experience. 110 In this light, we now review
three current proposals to amend Federal Rule 68.
A. Judge William Schwarzer's Proposal
In his proposed revision of the federal offer of judgment provision,
United States District Judge William Schwarzer makes available the offer
of judgment tactic to the plaintiff as well as the defendant. 111 His version of
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1999, 2029-2030 (1989). To our knowledge, there is no
study applying the diffusion of innovation literature to the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure by the states. See supra note 104.
106 These provisions are listed and briefly described in Appendix A.
107 Many procedural rules do not generate such activity, because they "do not
further the goals of strong interest groups because they do not systemically or
predictably affect the outcomes of categories of cases." Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H.
Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 149
(1996) (footnote omitted). But controversial procedural rules, like offer of judgment
provisions, provide an exception. See id. at 149 n.63.
108 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. Rv. 795 (1991).
109 See RICHARD L. MARcus, FT AL., CIvIL P ROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH
118 (2d ed. 1995) (noting the influence of Field Code on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
110 See Subrin, supra note 105, at 2045.
Ill See William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to
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Rule 68 would also impose reasonable attorney's fees and costs on the
offeree who rejected an offer more favorable than the eventual judgment.
His proposal, however, would limit the award of attorney's fees to the
extent necessary to "make the offeror whole" for the costs incurred after
the rejection of the offer; and Judge Schwarzer explicitly limits the award
of costs and attorney's fees to the amount of judgment obtained. Judge
Schwarzer's proposed amendment also vests discretion with the court to
reduce an award of costs and attorney's fees in order to avoid an imposition
of undue hardship on a party. With respect to the claim involving injunctive
or equitable relief, the proposed amendment would compare the judgment
obtained and the offer only when the terms of the offer include all such
nonmonetary relief. Furthermore, Judge Schwarzer argues that the revised
rule's incentive structure, based on the imposition of risks on the parties, is
sufficiently limited by the make whole and capping restrictions. 112 These
risks are eliminated, Judge Schwarzer posits, because no costs are
recoverable when judgment is for the defendant, and neither side can
expect to recover disproportionate attorney's fees and costs.
In articulating his proposal, Judge Schwarzer argues that his provision
answers the widespread criticisms of the 1983 and 1984 proposals.
Specifically, he posits that the proposed revision does not threaten plaintiffs
with out-of-pocket expenses. 113 Furthermore, the provision does not
undercut the policy of fee-shifting statutes, unlike the Marek decision,
which held that Rule 68 could bar an award of statutory attorney's fees to a
prevailing civil rights party plaintiff who had rejected a settlement offer that
exceeded the judgment. 114 Furthermore, the proposal does not permit
windfall recoveries or recovery of disproportionate costs. Finally, Judge
Schwarzer argues that the proposed revision eliminates the need for judicial
review of the reasonableness of offers and rejections, although he
acknowledges that the trial court is vested with discretion to determine
whether the sanction of attorney's fees is appropriate in the case where
imposition of fees would not cause undue hardship. 115
Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992).
112 See id. at 150.
113 See id. at 152.
114 See id. at 157. Judge Schwarzer would exclude civil rights and antitrust laws to
avoid undercutting the congressional policy encouraging private enforcement of these
statutory provisions.
115 See id. at 152.
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B. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Again
In the mid-1990s, the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee
attempted to once again address the problems inherent in Federal Rule
68.116 The Committee Note to the new Rule 68 proposal begins with the
declaration that Federal Rule 68 "has been properly criticized as one-sided
and largely ineffectual," providing little inducement to make or accept
offers because the penalty in most cases typically includes only trivial
taxable costs.11 7 The Committee also acknowledges the concerns and
criticisms of the prior proposed amendments, and attempts to correct the
perceived deficiencies contained in the 1983 and 1984 proposals, based on
Judge Schwarzer's revisions and submission of an amended Rule 68.118
The proposed rule allows any party to make a Rule 68 offer. Amended
Rule 68(e) also provides that where the final judgment is less favorable to
the offeree than the offer, the offeree must pay a sanction to the offeror.1 9
The penalty imposed on the offeree consists of costs incurred by the offeror
after the offer expired and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the
offeror after the offer expired. This remedy is subject to two limitations:
(1) the amount of post-offer attorney's fees is reduced by the difference
between the judgment; and (2) the offer and the attorney fee award cannot
exceed the amount of the judgment.120 A plaintiff who wins nothing pays
no attorney's fees, and a defendant pays no more in fees than the amount of
the judgment. In addition to requiring the attorney's fees to be reasonable,
the proposal also vests the trial court with discretion to reduce the sanction
to avoid undue hardship or reasonable surprise, even to the point of
denying any award to the offeror. 12 1
116 The proposed rule and advisory committee's note are reprinted in Cooper,
supra note 6, at 135-147.
117 See id. at 138. Although the Advisory Committee recognized that the Marek
decision significantly increased the incentive in cases involving statutes that authorized
attorney's fees as part of the plaintiff's recovery, the Committee acknowledged the
criticism of the Marek decision as inconsistent with statutory policies that specifically
favored special categories of claims that countenanced the right to recover fees.
118 See id. The advisory committee's note expressly cited Judge Schwarzer's
proposed revision as the basis for many of the changes in the 1993 amendment. See id.
119 However, an offeree who is statutorily entitled to an award of attorney's fees is
immune from the sanction of attorney's fees. See id. The advisory committee's note
would overturn the Marek Court's interpretation of Rule 68. See id. at 141. The
Committee rejects the award of attorney's fees against a party entitled to recover
statutory fees because the sanction could interfere with the legislative determination that
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C. ABA Proposal'22
The House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA) has
responded to concerns for reformation of civil justice by advocating the
retooling of current offer of judgment procedures instead of rushing to
adopt the "English" rule.1 23 The ABA proposal represents a self-described
compromise between the draconian loser pays position and the present
Federal Rule 68.124 The measure also reflects a compromise between the
pro-plaintiff Section of Litigation and the generally pro-defendant Section
of Tort and Insurance Practice.1 25 In its proposal, the ABA cites the need
for plaintiffs to be able to invoke the offer of judgment tactic, while also
providing an incentive to settle by imposing attorney's fees as well as costs,
whereby limiting the operation of cost shifting by introducing a 25%
margin of error.
the underlying claim deserves special protection. See id. at 144.
120 See Cooper, supra note 6, at 136-137 (proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68(e)).
121 See id. at 143-144. An example of extreme or undue hardship would be the
case where a severely injured plaintiff rejected a $100,000 offer and was subsequently
awarded that amount while the offeror incurred $100,000 worth of fees. The Advisory
Committee states that "[a] fee award that would wipe out any recovery by the plaintiff
could be found unfair." Id. Similarly, surprise would most likely be found when the law
has changed between the time an offer expired and the time of the judgment.
122 ABA Urges Offer of Judgment Changes to Counter Movement to "Loser Pays"
Rule, 64 U.S.L.W. 2495 (1996).
123 See id. at 2495. The final vote of the delegates was almost evenly divided on
the issue with 202 votes endorsing the new proposal and 188 votes in favor of the status
quo. See id.
124 See id. The new proposal represents a "compromise to address the concerns
raised by the loser pays proponents" as well as recently enacted loser pays bills and
pending loser pays legislation in several other states. See id. One of the proposal's
promoters states that the ABA's offer of judgment revision represents "the most benign
and most practical" alternative to the loser pays bills. See id.
125 See id.
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The proposed measure allows plaintiffs as well as defendants to make
offers of judgment. Furthermore, the offeree who rejects a more favorable
offer than she receives at trial must pay the offeror's costs, including all
reasonable attorney's fees and expenses, but excluding expert witness fees
and expenses incurred after the date of the offer.' 26 However, this penalty
provision does not operate to shift costs to the offeree unless the final
judgment is greater than 125% of the amount of the offer. 127 Similarly, an
offeror cannot recover costs unless the final judgment obtained is less than
75% of the amount of the offer.128 The proposal specifically limits the fee
award to the amount of the judgment and exempts from its fee-shifting
provisions causes of action which contemplate attorney's fees as part of a
remedy. 129
The ABA proposal has several equitable limiters that prevent harsh
imposition of the penalty provision. First, the court may reduce or
eliminate the amount to be shifted under the rule to avoid hardship, to
uphold the interest of justice, or to satisfy any other compelling reason. 130
Next, as in Judge Schwarzer's proposed revision, the amount of any
attorney's fees "may not exceed the actual amount of fees incurred by the
offeree after the date of the offer." 131 Finally, like the proposed Ohio Rule
68, any party may, at any time after the commencement of the action, seek
a court ruling that the offer of judgment procedure does not apply to the
proceeding.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. The amount of the fee award may not exceed the total money amount of
the money judgment. See id.
129 See id.
130 See id. The ABA defines a compelling reason as one "that justifies the offeree
party in having sought a judicial resolution of the suit rather than accepting the offer of
judgment." Id.
131 Id.
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D. The Ohio Proposal
The offer of judgment rule considered by the Ohio Supreme Court in
1996 has already been described. 132 It resembles in some ways the three
proposals just described (notably by permitting all parties to make
offers), 133 but differs in more dramatic ways. The Ohio proposal disclaims
any effort to shift attorney's fees under any circumstances and vests no
discretion in the trial court to engage in an ex post facto evaluation of the
reasonableness of offers made. It is, then, much shorter and simpler than
the other proposals. But these are substantive virtues, and make it more
likely that something like the Ohio proposal will serve as a model to
survive the political gauntlet toward approval.
Recognizing and indeed agreeing with the critics of Marek, the Ohio
proposal does not cover cases involving fee-shifting statutes, nor does it
attempt to shift fees at all. 134 Marek has few if any defenders; thus it is not
difficult to defend excluding fee-shifting statutes from the operation of the
rule. More problematic is eschewing any fee-shifting at all to reward
certain offers of judgment. As Professor Edward Cooper has observed,
shifting attorney's fees in offer of judgment proposals is a "lightning rod
for controversy," perhaps fueled by the "emotional support" for the
American rule on such fees. 135 Given that controversy, coupled with the
uncertainties of the effect of shifting such fees, 136 we think any realistic
proposal should, as an incremental first step, leave out the shifting of such
fees. 137 Likewise, the Ohio proposal uses the bright line test of awarding
costs to defendants, or double costs to plaintiffs. The complications for both
judges and practitioners in other proposals are excluded. The sheer
complexity of the proposals may deter their use, 138 and no doubt lead to
collateral litigation.
132 See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
133 To our knowledge no one has seriously argued that offer of judgment
provisions should be restricted to those made by defendants. Why the present Federal
Rule is drafted this way is unclear. Cf. WRIM"rr ET AL., supra note 10, § 3001, at 67
(praising the rule as drafted by providing no specific defense of restriction to
defendants' offers).
134 By the same token, the Ohio proposal does not purport to overrule Marek (at
the state level) by defining costs to exclude attorney's fees. The most recent Advisory
Committee proposal does just that. See Cooper, supra note 6, at 117, 141.
135 Id. at 110.
136 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text (summarizing economic and
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No doubt, this proposal can be criticized as being too weak. 139 It is
common ground that the present Federal Rule is rarely used because court
costs are typically quite modest and thus provide little incentive (or
disincentive) even when shifted. 140 Doubling such costs as under the
proposal perhaps will not make much difference, but we think it is a
modest first step which will encourage settlement.
empirical literature on Rule 68).
137 See also LARRY KRAmER, Rule 68 and Settlement Dynamics, in REFO RMING
THE Cvu JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 154-155 (arguing that any revised Rule 68
should not shift attorney's fees).
138 See Cooper, supra note 6, at 113 n.6. Present Rule 68 seems complicated
enough as it is. Most of the proposed amendments to the Rule would address issues not
in the present Rule like successive offers, the effect of nonmonetary relief and the effect
of multiple parties. See id. at 135-137 (reprinting most recent proposal of Federal Rules
Advisory Committee).
139 We can easily dispose of the opposite reasons against the Ohio proposal
advanced by the OATL. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Whether there
is an "overabundance of unnecessary trials," in Ohio or elsewhere, is certainly open to
empirical debate. See supra note 96; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most
Cases Settle". Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv.
1339 (1994); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: Vhat We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syvervd, Don't Try:
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1996). But
that is not the basis of the proposal, which is simply to encourage settlement of all civil
litigation. Likewise, the OATL letter is devoid of any reference to empirical sources
which would substantiate its charge that the proposal would adversely impact plaintiffs.
The charge is especially unpersuasive given that the proposal covers offers by plaintiffs
as well, excludes claims brought under a fee-shifting statute and does not shift fees at
all. See also Bell, supra note 9, at 16 (discussing and supporting the Ohio proposal).
140 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 59, at 575 n.2; Rowe with Vidmar, supra note
61, at 14; Schwarzer, supra note 111, at 149.
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V. CONCLUSION
The numerous, failed efforts to amend Federal Rule 68 grew out of
renewed efforts by policymakers in the 1980s and 1990s to encourage
alternative dispute resolution and greater judicial control over the
management of litigation. 141 Those efforts have failed, largely due, we
think, to the complexity of the numerous proposals, uncertainty as to how
they would operate and the perception-rightly or wrongly-that many of
the proposals would operate adversely to plaintiffs. 142
Despite the gridlock at the federal level, rulemakers in many state
courts have not been reticent about pursuing innovations in regulating and
encouraging offers of judgment. This largely unexamined
experimentation' 43 is a potentially rich source of experience that could
inform rulemaking at both the federal level, and in those states that have
only replicated Federal Rule 68, or have no offer of judgment provision at
all. Modest proposals like that considered in Ohio in 1996 are an
appropriate first step to enliven the use of offers of judgment.
141 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
Construct? Trends in Adjudicating Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BRooK. L.
REV. 659, 728 n.251 (1993) (placing proposals to amend Rule 68 in larger context of
procedural reform and efforts to adopt some form of attorney-fee shifting).
142 See Subrin, supra note 105, at 2043 n.225.
143 Such experimentation could take place (and perhaps already is) in diversity
litigation in federal court. See, e.g., S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage
Dist., 60 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Wisconsin offer of judgment statute in
diversity case). See generally 12 WRIGirr ET AL., supra note 10, § 3001.2, at 80-89
(discussing application of state offer of judgment provisions in federal court).
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APPENDIX A-STATE OFFER OF JUDGMENT PROVISIONS
Alabama: ALA. R. CIV. P. 68 (Michie 1996) (like Fed. R. Civ. P. 68).
Alaska: ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68 & ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Michie
1996) (both sides can make offer; interest on judgment increased or
decreased under certain circumstances).
Arizona: ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 68 (1996) (both sides can make offer;
reasonable expert witness fees and double taxable costs awardable).
Arkansas: ARK. R. CIV. P. 68 (Michie 1997) (like Fed. R. Civ. P. 68;
costs defined to exclude attorney's fees).
California: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1993) (both sides can
make offer).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-202 (West 1996) (both sides
can make offer).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-195 (West 1997) (both sides
can make offer).
Delaware: DEL. SUPER. CT. 68 (like FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
District of Columbia: D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 68 (like FED. R. CIv.
P. 68).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79 (West 1997) (both sides can make
offer; attorney's fees can be shifted under certain circumstances).
Georgia: no apparent provision.
Hawaii: HAw. R. CIv. P. 68 (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Idaho: IDAHO R. CIV. P. 68 (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68; can include
attorney's fees).
Illinois: no apparent provision.
Indiana: IND. R. TRIAL P. 68 (West 1996) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Iowa: 1997 IOWA R. Civ. P. 68 (West) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2002(b) (1994) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Kentucky: KY. R. CIV. P. 68 (Michie 1997) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
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Louisiana: no apparent provision.
Maine: ME. R. CIV. P. 68 (West 1996) (like FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
Maryland: no apparent provision.
Massachusetts: MASS. R. CIV. P. 68 (West 1992) (like FED. R. CIV. P.
68).
Michigan: MICH. R. CT. 2.405 (1994) (both sides can make offer; costs
and attorney's fees shifted under certain circumstances).
Minnesota: MINN. R. CIV. P. 68 (both sides can make offer; attorney's
fees shifted under certain circumstances).
Mississippi: MISS. R. CIV. P. 68 (1997) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Missouri: no apparent provision.
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-20 (1993), Rule 68 (like FED. R. CIV.
P. 68).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-901 (1997) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Nevada: NEV. R. CIV. P. 68 (1995) (both sides can make offer; attorney's
fees shifted under certain circumstances).
New Hampshire: no apparent provision.
New Jersey: N.J. CT. R. 4:58 (West 1992) (both sides can make offer).
New Mexico: N.M. DIST. CT. R. CIv. P. 1-068 (like FED. R. CIV. P.
68).
New York: N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3221 (McKinney 1992) (like FED. R. Civ. P.
68).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1 (1997), Rule 68 (like FED. R.
Cxv. P. 68).
North Dakota: N.D. R. CIV. P. 68 (1996) (both sides can make offer).
Ohio: OHIO R. CIV. P. 68 (Anderson 1996) (expressly forbids cost
shifting).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 940, 1101 (West 1997) (like
FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Oregon: OR. R. CIv. P. 54(E) (1988) (like FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
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Pennsylvania: PA. R. CIV. P. 238 (West 1988) (limits offers to defendants,
but provides enhanced prejudgment interest to certain plaintiffs who prevail
at trial).
Rhode Island: R.I. R. CIV. P. 68 (1992) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. R. Civ. P. 68 (Law Co-op 1975) (like
FED. R. CIV. P. 68; defendant can also recover costs when plaintiff fails to
obtain any judgment at trial).
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-6-68 (Michie 1997) (like FED.
R. CIV. P. 68).
Tennessee: TENN. CIV. P. R. 68 (1994) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Texas: no apparent provision.
Utah: UTAH R. CIV. P. 68 (1997) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
Vermont: VT. R. CIV. P. 68 (1997) (like FED. R. Civ. P. 68).
Virginia: no apparent provision.
Washington: WASH. R. CIV. P. 68 (West 1996) (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
West Virginia: W. VA. R. CIV. P. 68 (Michie 1997) (like FED. R. CIV. P.
68).
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (West 1995) (both sides can make
offer; costs and 12% interest on judgment can be shifted).
Wyoming: WYO. R. Civ. P. 68 (like FED. R. CIV. P. 68).
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APPENDIX B-PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO OHIO RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
RULE 68. Offer of Judgment
An offer of judgment by any party, if refused by an opposite party,
may not be filed with the court by the offering party for purposes at
proceedifig todrne costS.
This rule shall not be construed as limiting voluntary offers oef
setfement made by any par:t.
(A) GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(1) AT ANY TIME MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS BEFORE THE
TRIAL BEGINS, OR ANY ADDITIONAL OR LESSER TIME AS THE
COURT ALLOWS, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE UPON THE ADVERSE
PARTY A WRITTEN OFFER TO ALLOW JUDGMENT TO BE
ENTERED FOR THE MONEY OR PROPERTY OR TO THE EFFECT
SPECIFIED IN THE OFFER, WITH COSTS THEN ACCRUED. IF
WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE SERVICE OF THE OFFER, OR
ANY ADDITIONAL OR LESSER TIME AS THE COURT ALLOWS,
THE ADVERSE PARTY SERVES WRITTEN NOTICE THAT THE
OFFER IS ACCEPTED, EITHER PARTY MAY THEN FILE THE
OFFER AND NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE TOGETHER WITH PROOF
OF SERVICE OF THE OFFER AND NOTICE. THE COURT SHALL
ENTER JUDGMENT UNDER CIV. R. 58. AN OFFER NOT
ACCEPTED SHALL BE CONSIDERED WITHDRAWN AND
EVIDENCE OF THE OFFER IS NOT ADMISSIBLE EXCEPT IN A
PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE COSTS.
(2) IF THE JUDGMENT FINALLY OBTAINED BY THE PARTY
SEEKING RELIEF IS NOT MORE FAVORABLE THAN AN OFFER BY
THE PARTY AGAINST WHOM RELIEF IS SOUGHT, THE OFFEREE
MUST PAY THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE OFFEROR AFTER THE
MAKING OF THE OFFER.
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(3) IF THE JUDGMENT FINALLY OBTAINED BY THE PARTY
SEEKING RELIEF IS NOT LESS FAVORABLE THAN AN OFFER
MADE BY THAT PARTY, THE OFFEREE MUST PAY DOUBLE THE
COSTS INCURRED BY THE OFFEROR AFTER THE MAKING OF
THE OFFER.
(4) THE FACT THAT AN OFFER IS MADE BUT NOT ACCEPTED
DOES NOT PRECLUDE SERVICE OF A SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN
OFFER, WITHIN THE TIME LIMITS SET IN THIS RULE.
(5) WHEN THE LIABILITY OF ONE PARTY TO ANOTHER HAS
BEEN DETERMINED BY VERDICT OR ORDER OR JUDGMENT,
BUT THE AMOUNT OR EXTENT OF THE LIABILITY REMAINS TO
BE DETERMINED BY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, ANY PARTY MAY
MAKE AN OFFER OF JUDGMENT, WHICH SHALL HAVE THE
SAME EFFECT AS AN OFFER MADE BEFORE TRIAL IF IT IS
SERVED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME NOT LESS THAN TEN
DAYS, OR ANY ADDITIONAL OR LESSER TIME AS THE COURT
ALLOWS, PRIOR TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF HEARINGS TO
DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OR EXTENT OF LIABILITY.
(B) EXCEPTIONS. THIS RULE SHALL NOT APPLY TO ANY OF
THE FOLLOWING:
(1) CLASS OR DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER CIV.
R. 23 OR CIV. R. 23.1;
(2) JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROCEEDINGS;
(3) PROBATE PROCEEDINGS, TO THE EXTENT THE RULE IS
CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO PROBATE PROCEEDINGS;
(4) CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES THAT MAY BE AWARDED
IN THE ACTION.
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Proposed Staff Note (effective July 1, 1997 Amendment)
Rule 68(A) General Provisions.
The amendment considerably changes Rule 68 of the Ohio Rules of
Civil Procedure [hereinafter Ohio Rule 68], and makes it very similar to
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Federal Rule
68], with one important difference: unlike the federal rule, Ohio Rule 68
encompasses offers of judgment by both plaintiffs and defendants.
When the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated, the
Federal Rules were generally used as a model. Ohio Rule 68 was one of
those rules where the model was not followed. Unlike the federal rule,
Ohio Rule 68 permitted offers of judgment to be made, but stated that the
offer "may not be filed with the court by the offering party for purposes of
a proceeding to determine costs." The Staff Note indicated that the federal
model was not followed because the "use of offers of judgment as the basis
of costs proceedings has in the past often had a one-sided, coercive effect."
Whatever the truth of this statement at the time it was made, over two
decades ago, the subject deserves revisiting.
Due to the crowded civil dockets of courts, coupled with the growing
recognition that voluntary settlements often lead to better outcomes than the
zero-sum game of contested litigation, a renewed emphasis on encouraging
settlement has occurred over the past two decades in Ohio. One way to
achieve that objective is to follow Federal Rule 68, which encourages pre-
trial offers of judgment to be made. The possible "coercive" effects of
Federal Rule 68 are difficult to measure and often appear to be based
almost wholly on anecdotal evidence. Studies of the issue do not reveal
compelling evidence of coercive effect. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 574-576 (4th ed. 1992); Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr. with Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A
Preliminary Report, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1988); William W.
Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing the
Cost of Litigation, 76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992). C. David A. Anderson,
Improving Settlement Devices: Rule 68 and Beyond, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
225 (1994) (reviewing theoretical and empirical studies of Federal Rule 68
and proposed alternatives to that rule).
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For these reasons, the amendment to Ohio Rule 68 largely tracks the
federal rule. There are some differences. To avoid confusion, the
amendment is limited to written offers of judgment. While, in general,
offers of judgment are to be made thirty days before trial (unlike ten days
in the federal rule), the amendment grants discretion to the trial court to
enlarge or shorten that period. And while the issue has been the source of
some confusion in the federal courts, it should be clear that the word
"costs" in the amendment does not include attorney's fees. Thus, costs
would be restricted to those awardable under Civ. R. 54(D), which Ohio
law holds does not include attorney's fees, unless a statute specifically
states otherwise. See Muze v. Mayfield, 573 N.E.2d 1076 (Ohio 1991).
The major difference from Federal Rule 68 is that the amendment
covers offers of judgment made by any party. Because the purpose of the
rule is to reward parties who make unaccepted offers of judgment which
end up being more favorable (to the nonaccepting party) than the relief
awarded, there seems no particular reason why plaintiffs' offers should not
be covered. The federal rule only covers offers by defendants. The
problem with including plaintiffs is that prevailing plaintiffs are eligible to
be awarded costs, anyway, under Ohio Rule 54(D). That is not true, of
course, with regard to nonprevailing defendants who nonetheless made
unaccepted offers of judgment which are more favorable than the relief
actually obtained by the plaintiffs.
Thus, greater and different incentives need be built into the rule to
reward plaintiffs in these situations. See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic
Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 123-125 (1986); Roy D.
Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1985). To
solve this problem, some states, in their versions of Federal Rule 68, have
permitted any party to make and file an offer of judgment and provide extra
rewards, in certain circumstances, to a plaintiff that makes an offer.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-192a(b) (12% interest added to award);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.79(b) (attorney's fees awardable under certain
circumstances); N.J. REV. STAT. § 4:58-2 (8% interest added); Wis.
STAT. § 807.01(3) (all costs doubled for plaintiff); ARIz. R. CIv. P. 68(d)
(double costs and expert witness fees awarded to either side); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 998(d) (expert witness fees). The amendment follows the
straight forward approach of permitting plaintiffs to recover double costs
from the time the offer is made. This provides an extra, but not
extravagant, reward to the plaintiff, beyond costs which would be
recoverable in any event under Ohio Rule 54(D).
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Finally, it is anticipated that the cost-shifting provision of the rule
would apply even if nonmonetary relief is sought, in whole or in part. If
the judgment obtained includes nonmonetary relief, a determination that it
is more favorable to the offeree than was the offer shall be made only when
the terms of the offer include all such nonmonetary relief. See Schwarzer,
at 151-152.
Rule 68(B) Exceptions.
Expressly excluded from the coverage of the rule are several categories
of cases to which application of offers of judgment would be unsuitable.
See OHIo R. Civ. P. 1(C) (listing other exceptions to the application of the
Civil Rules).
Division (3)(1) excludes class actions brought under Ohio Civil Rule 23
or derivative suits brought under Ohio Civil Rule 23.1. In both those
instances the court must approve a settlement. See OHIo R. CIV. P. 23(E);
011o R. CIv. P. 23.1. To permit unapproved offers of judgment to be
operative to shift fees would conflict with the judicial duty to oversee
settlements in these cases.
Division (B)(2) excludes cases in juvenile or domestic relations courts,
where the offer of judgment procedure appears not to be appropriate in any
circumstance.
Division (3)(3) excludes only those cases in probate courts where the
rule is clearly inapplicable. The rule may have some relevance in will
contests and complaints for concealment of assets, among other things.
Finally, Division (B)(4) excludes claims where attorney's fees may be
awarded in the action, including but not necessarily limited to cases brought
under statutes which permit a prevailing party to recover attorney's fees. It
is well settled under Ohio law both that (a) costs do not include attorney's
fees, unless a statute specifically states to the contrary, see, e.g., Muze v.
Mayfield, supra, and (b) the American Rule on attorney's fees is followed,
meaning that such fees are ordinarily not recoverable in the absence of a
fee-shifting statute or a contractual provision providing therefor, see, e.g.,
Nottingdale Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Darby, 514 N.E.2d 702 (Ohio
1987). To permit an Ohio Rule 68 proceeding to prevent a plaintiff
prevailing under such a statute, who had rejected a settlement offer that
exceeded a judgment, from collecting attorney's fees would undercut the
presumed policy of the General Assembly to encourage private
enforcement of attorney's fees statutes.
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This position is arguably in conflict with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of Federal Rule 68 in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1
(1985). There, the majority of the Court held that Federal Rule 68 could
bar an award of statutory attorney's fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff
who had rejected a settlement offer that exceeded the judgment. Whatever
the merits of this decision, it creates a tension with the promotion of private
enforcement of law embodied in a statutory fee-shifting provision. See
Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 478-479 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.),
rev'd 473 U.S. 1 (1985); see also Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. at 28-35
(Brennan, J., dissenting). More importantly, the Marek decision appears to
conflict with Ohio cases which clearly differentiate attorney's fees from
costs; the former is not subsumed in the latter. Cf. Boltz & Odegaard v.
Hohn, 714 P.2d 854, 858 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (declining to follow Marek
in the interpretation of Arizona's offer of judgment rule, given "the clear
position the Arizona courts have taken that attorney's fees are not costs").
In addition, the exception only departs from Marek with respect to
attorney's fees. A plaintiff still can be prevented from recovering costs in
an action brought under a statute with an attorney's-fee shifting mechanism,
and attorney's fees could be recovered if the parties by prior agreement
provided for recovery of attorney's fees by a prevailing party. See, e.g.,
Nottingdale Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., supra; Schwarzer, at 152.
Conversely, a defendant would not be able to recover attorney's fees unless
the statute defined defendants to be prevailing parties for the purpose of
recovering attorney's fees. Cf. Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329 (1st
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). Finally, outside the
boundaries of Ohio Rule 68, parties are entirely free to reach a settlement
on all aspects of a case, including the issue of attorney's fees.

